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First, in the spirit of the age, I must start with somedisclaimers. I write as a mere lawyer, and I am veryconscious that the matter under consideration is one
that has to engage the assistance of many disciplines.
Moreover, I have spent the whole of my professional life in
the courtroom, first as a barrister and now as a judge. So
that my perspective inevitably reflects my forensic
experience, though the subject extends far beyond that
rather narrow context. Finally, and I know this will be
disappointing to you, I have no solutions or even
suggestions as to how the interests of our children can be
better represented. My more modest task is to explain why
it is so important that we make sure that our children are
properly represented and to identify a few areas where our
present arrangements are perhaps not always as satisfactory
as they should be. My survey is partial and slanted,
reflecting in major part the problems that the
happenstance of litigation has brought my way.
I must start with the Human Rights Act 1998 and the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. The Act is of fundamental,
indeed almost revolutionary, importance. For the first time
it confers upon the citizen and the denizen legally
enforceable constitutional and human rights. You may be
surprised to hear me say it, but at common law there is no
such thing as a constitutional right, using the term in what
the legal philosophers would consider its only proper
meaning. What we traditionally refer to as our
constitutional rights are more correctly described as
liberties, privileges or freedoms. Those of a jurisprudential
turn of mind will recognise the reference here to Hohfeld’s
Fundamental Legal Conceptions at p 47.
Now this is not some arid piece of legal pedantry. It is a
point of great importance. Traditionally our constitutional
and human rights fell into two broad categories. First,
there were “rights” – in truth, liberties, privileges or
freedoms – such as freedom of speech and freedom of
association. At common law, freedom of speech was
founded on nothing more than the principle that, absent
some specific prohibition imposed, for example, by the law
of libel or the law of obscenity, a man is free to write and
say what he wants. So with freedom of religion and
freedom of association. These were not rights enforceable
by action in the courts – which indeed is why they were not
rights at all in strict legal theory. Secondly, there were rights
properly so called, where infringements of the right,
because it involved a correlative breach by someone else of
a legal duty, gave rise to an action, typically an action in
tort. So if a man’s house was unlawfully searched or he was
assaulted by agents of the state an action in trespass lay, just
as it would against any other tortfeasor.
Please do not misunderstand me. Our old constitutional
settlement served us remarkably well. Generations of our
ancestors were blessed that they did not have to apply to
some government office to seek permission to publish a
newspaper or to set up some association of like-minded
people. As the great legal historian Maitland once
remarked, speaking of the religious liberty granted to
barely tolerated sects (Selected Essays at p 183): “All that they
had to ask from the state was that the open preaching of
their doctrines should not be unlawful.” And generations
have cause to be grateful that every Minister of the King,
however powerful, could always be brought to account in a
court of law if he broke, or caused his minions to break,
the law.
But the fact is that the old constitutional settlement had
its limitations.
In the first place, whilst it may have obliged the state not
to interfere in certain activities – at least not unless the
state could obtain Parliamentary authority to do so – it
imposed no positive obligations on the state. Secondly, it
tended to protect the citizen from official wrongdoing only
if that wrongdoing could be brought within the ambit of
either the criminal law or the law of tort. Thus the law
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protected the citizen from false imprisonment – a man
unlawfully held in a prison could obtain a writ of habeas
corpus and sue for damages for false imprisonment – but
gave him little remedy against being detained lawfully but
in degrading conditions. And the Secretary of State could
only be held liable for those for whose acts he was
vicariously liable. So a prisoner who was assaulted by a
prison officer could sue the Home Secretary; a prisoner
who was assaulted by another prisoner could not. To an
extent these difficulties could be overcome by extensions
of the law of negligence or by that surprisingly recent
development, the public law administered by the
Administrative Court. But these were in many ways
inadequate.
Our public law in particular was crippled by its
identification of rationality as the benchmark of the legality
of decision-making by public authorities. Whilst European
jurisprudence was developing proportionality as the test of
legality, so long as the so-called Wednesbury test of rationality
held sway in our domestic courts, the decision of a public
authority could be struck down by our courts only if it was
“so outrageous in [its] defiance of logic or of accepted
moral standards that no sensible person who had applied
his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived
at it” (Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister
for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 at p 410).
The importance of the Human Rights Act is not merely
that it makes the Convention directly enforceable in our
domestic courts. It confers rights in the strict sense of the
word: rights matched by the correlative obligation,
imposed on every public authority by section 6 of the Act
and backed up by the remedies granted by sections 7 and
8 of the Act, not to act, or fail to act, in a way which is
incompatible with Convention rights. It confers rights
which in many cases oblige the state – public authorities –
to take positive action. And it introduces proportionality as
the benchmark of legality when the state is proposing to act
in a manner which engages a Convention right.
For present purposes the most important provision in
the Convention is Article 8 which, as you all know, protects
“the right to respect for … private and family life”. Article
8(2) provides that:
“There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”
Article 8(2) requires the judicial or other decision-
maker to carry out what is conventionally called a
balancing exercise. The key to this is the Convention
concept of proportionality. To meet the test of
proportionality it has to be shown that what the state is
proposing to do is in pursuit of one of the legitimate aims
provided for in the Convention and that it is “necessary in
a democratic society”. That is to say, the reasons given
must be “relevant and sufficient”, they must correspond to
a “pressing social need” and must be “proportionate” to
the legitimate aim being pursued (Hale LJ in Re W and B,
Re W (Care Plan) [2001] EWCA Civ 757, [2001] 2 FLR
582, at para [54]). It can readily be seen what a far cry this
is from the old common-law test of rationality.
I should also refer to Article 3 which, without
qualification or exception, prohibits “torture or …
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.
STATE INTERFERENCE WITH FAMILY LIFE
It may be convenient at this point to consider two
different types of reason why the state may seek to
interfere with family life. Let me give three examples. The
state seeks to send the mother of a baby to prison. Or the
state seeks to deport a convicted drug smuggler or failed
asylum seeker who has a wife and child in this country, in
circumstances where it may be difficult or even impossible
for his wife and child to follow him abroad. Or the state, in
the form of a local authority, seeks an interim care order
placing a child in foster-care. Now in each case the
consequence to the child of the state’s threatened activity
may be the same – separation from his or her parent – but
what the state is actually doing is not at all the same in all
three cases.
In the first and second cases the analysis is simple and
obvious: the state is seeking to do something which
involves an interference in family life but is doing so in
pursuit of its own ends – in pursuit of the public interest;
specifically, the interest of the state – the public interest –
to use the language of Article 8(2) in “public safety” or
“the prevention of disorder or crime”. In cases of this kind
both the Strasbourg jurisprudence and the decisions of our
domestic courts are at one: the interests of the child,
although they plainly have to be taken into account, are
neither paramount nor primary. There is a balancing
exercise in which the scales start even (see the authorities
discussed in Re A (Care Proceedings: Asylum Seekers) [2003]
EWHC 1086 (Fam), [2003] 2 FLR 921, at paras
[49]–[53]).
But in the third case – the care proceedings – something
different is going on. Because, subject only to meeting what
family lawyers call ‘threshold’, both our domestic law –
section 1(1)(a) of the Children Act 1989 – and the
Strasbourg jurisprudence give priority to the child’s best
interests (see sections 31(2) and 38(2) of the Children Act
1989; note that there is no threshold requirement when
the proceedings relate to a mentally incompetent adult: Re
S (Adult Patient) (Inherent Jurisdiction: Family Life) [2002]
EWHC 2278 (Fam), [2003] 1 FLR 292, at para [45], Re S
(Adult’s Lack of Capacity: Carer and Residence) [2003] EWHC
1909 (Fam), [2003] 2 FLR 1235, at para [13]). If the
rights of a parent and her child conflict then domestic law 3
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requires the conflict to be resolved by reference to the
child’s best interests. In domestic law the governing
consideration is the child’s welfare. So it is under the
Convention. Strasbourg jurisprudence has long recognised
that, in the final analysis, parental rights have to give way to
the child’s. (I might add that the answer is no different
where the child, although now an adult, remains
unemancipated because mentally incapacitated: see Re S
(Adult Patient) at para [42]). As the European Court of
Human Rights at Strasbourg has very recently said (Yousef v
The Netherlands [2003] 1 FLR 210 at para [73]):
“In judicial decisions where the rights under Article 8 of
parents and those of a child are at stake, the child’s rights
must be the paramount consideration. If any balancing of
interests is necessary, the interests of the child must prevail.”
Why is this so?
When we think of Article 8 we tend to think of it as a
protection against the serious interference in a parent’s
right to respect for family life which occurs when the state
– often in the guise of a local authority – seeks
compulsorily to separate parent and child. Such an
interference by the state in the internal life of a family is a
very serious matter. After all, the family, whatever form it
takes, is the bedrock of our society and the foundation of
our way of life.
But the parents’ rights to respect for their family life are
only a part, even if a very important part, of the picture.
Parent and child both have rights protected by Article 8,
and Article 8 protects the right to respect for both
“private” and “family” life. Private life is not the same as
family life and the two may sometimes come into conflict.
In particular, the parent’s right to respect for his or her
family life may come into conflict with the child’s rights to
respect both for his or her family life and for his or her
private life. Let me explain why and then move on to
explain the significance of the point.
CONCEPT OF PRIVATE LIFE
I need not further elaborate what is meant by family life,
but it is important for present purposes to understand
what is embraced within the concept of private life. In
Niemietz v Germany (1993) 16 EHRR 97 the Strasbourg
Court indicated at para [29] that private life includes at
least two elements. The first is the notion of “an “inner
circle” in which the individual may live his own personal
life as he chooses”; the second is “the right to establish and
develop relationships with other human beings”. The court
developed this in Botta v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 241, a case
which I venture to suggest is of fundamental importance to
every family lawyer. What the court said (at para [32]) was
this:
“Private life, in the court’s view, includes a person’s physical
and psychological integrity; the guarantee afforded by
Article 8 of the Convention is primarily intended to ensure the
development, without outside interference, of the personality of
each individual in his relations with other human beings.”
This has been elaborated by the court in further cases
(Bensaid v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 205 at para
[47], Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1, [2002] 2
FLR 45, at para [61]) where it was pointed out that:
“Article 8 … protects a right to personal development, and
the right to establish and develop relationships with other
human beings and the outside world.”
In Pretty v United Kingdom the court stressed at para [65]
that:
“The very essence of the Convention is respect for human
dignity and human freedom.”
It follows from this that, included in the private life
respect for which is guaranteed by Article 8, and embraced
in the “physical and psychological integrity” protected by
Article 8, is the right to participate in the life of the
community and to have access to an appropriate range of
social, recreational and cultural activities (Re S (Adult
Patient) at paras [114]–[123], R (A, B, X and Y) v East Sussex
CC (No 2) [2003] EWHC 167 (Admin), (2003) 6 CCLR
194, at paras [99] and [114], Re Roddy (a child) (identification:
restriction on publication), Torbay Borough Council v News Group
Newspapers [2003] EWHC 2927 (Fam), [2004] FCR 481
and Claire F v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004]
EWHC 111 (Fam) at paras [44]–[45], [107]). The Strasbourg
jurisprudence recognises that the ability to lead one’s own
personal life as one chooses, the ability to develop one’s
personality, indeed one’s very psychological and moral
integrity, are dependant upon being able to interact and
develop relationships with other human beings and with
the world at large. Similarly, the private life protected by
Article 8 extends to the emotional and developmental
environment in which a child is brought up. A child’s
Article 8 rights may be engaged if he is being bought up in
surroundings that isolate him socially or confine or stultify
him emotionally. The ability to establish and develop
relationships with the outside world – the ability to
participate in the life of the community – is an important
aspect of the “psychological integrity” protected by Article 8.
DUTIES IMPOSED ON THE STATE BY
ARTICLE 8
So much for family and private life. What of the duties
imposed on the state by Article 8? The Strasbourg Court
has long recognised – the principle goes back at least as far
as Marckx v Belgium (1979–80) 2 EHRR 330 – that the
respect for private and family life which Article 8
guarantees imposes on the state not merely the duty to
abstain from inappropriate interference but also, in some
cases, certain positive duties. The state may be obliged to
take positive action to prevent or stop another individual
from interfering with private life. As the court put it in
Botta v Italy at para [33]:4
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“While the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the
individual against arbitrary interference by the public
authorities, it does not merely compel the state to abstain
from such interference: in addition to this negative
undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in
effective respect for private or family life. These obligations
may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure
respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of
individuals between themselves.”
Now this has very important implications. The first is
this. As Botta v Italy shows, the state, even in the sphere of
relations between purely private individuals, may have
positive obligations to adopt measures which will ensure
effective respect for the child’s private life. Thus the state,
in the form of the local authority, may have a positive
obligation to intervene, even at the risk of detriment to the
parent’s family life, if such intervention is necessary to
ensure respect for the child’s Article 8 rights. And the
state, in the form of the High Court, has a positive
obligation to act in such a way as to ensure respect for
those rights. There is perhaps nothing very surprising in
this. The Crown as parens patriae has the duty and obligation
to protect those unable to look after themselves. If I can be
forgiven for quoting what I once said (Re F, F v Lambeth
London Borough Council [2002] 1 FLR 217 at para [41]):
“Modern reference to the ‘rights’ of the citizen can sometimes
lead one to overlook the equal importance of what was once
very clearly understood as the “duty” of the Crown to its
subjects. Today the rights of the citizen are mirrored by the
duty of the state. Expressed in the language of the new
constitutional settlement, the parents and the boys are
guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention their rights to
respect for private and family life. By acceding to the
Convention the state bound itself to secure these rights to the
parents and to the boys. Moreover, since 2 October 2000 it
has been the duty of every public authority (and for this
purpose both [the local authority] and this court are public
authorities … ) not to act in a way which is incompatible
with the citizen’s Convention rights. In more traditional
language it is the duty of the Crown as parens patriae to
protect children against injury of whatever kind from whatever
source.”
So what the state – the local authority – is actually doing
when it seeks to take a child into care can usefully be
analysed in terms of the state fulfilling the duties cast upon
it by Article 8. Botta v Italy shows that the state in the form
of a local authority does not merely have the power to
commence care proceedings under section 31 of the
Children Act; it may in certain circumstances be under a
duty to do so.
Now you may not think the analysis is useful, and in
terms of day to day practice it probably is not. After all, we
simply apply sections 31 and 38 of the Children Act
without asking – without needing to ask – what precisely it
is that we are doing. But when the case involves not a child
but a mentally incapacitated adult, the analysis is more
useful. As you will know, the consequence of historical
anomaly and a historical mistake is that the only
jurisdiction available in the case of a mentally incapacitated
adult is the court’s inherent declaratory jurisdiction (see A
v A Health Authority, In re J (A Child), R (S) v Secretary of State
for the Home Department [2002] EWHC 18 (Fam/Admin),
[2002] Fam 213, at paras [35]-[40]). First discovered by
the House of Lords in 1989 in a case involving medical
treatment (In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC
1), this jurisdiction has, by a remarkable process of judicial
pragmatism and inventiveness, evolved into something
which is now sufficiently broad as to encompass what is, in
all but name, a non-statutory care jurisdiction in relation
to mentally incapacitated adults, enabling a local authority
in an appropriate case to be invested, as it were, with all the
powers it would have if a care order in respect of a child
had been made in its favour. This development started as
recently as 1992 (see Re C (Mental Patient: Contact) [1993] 1
FLR 940). Its most recent manifestations are to be seen in
Re S (Adult Patient) and Re S (Adult’s Lack of Capacity) (see in
particular Re S (Adult Patient) at para [11]). I venture to
suggest that it is Article 8 as expounded in cases such as
Botta v Italy that explains what it is that the court is actually
doing in such a case and also why it is that the court must
continue to develop this novel jurisdiction if it is to comply
with its duty under section 6 of the Human Rights Act.
So much for the process by which a child enters the care
system. But what of the child who has been taken into
care? Here the state’s – the local authority’s – positive
obligations are even more compelling. As Botta v Italy itself
shows, the positive obligations which arise under Article 8
may be fairly limited if the complaint is that the state has
simply failed to act altogether. As the court explained at
para [33]:
“In order to determine whether such obligations exist, regard
must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between
the general interest and the interests of the individual.”
But it is much more difficult for the state to justify
inaction once it has chosen to intervene and has, by its
intervention, actually interfered with family life, for
example, by taking a child into care.
Children are to be taken away from their parents by the
state if, and only if, the conditions set out in section 31 of
the Children Act are satisfied, that is, if the local authority
can establish that the children have suffered or are likely to
suffer significant harm as a result of parental default. The
state assumes a heavy burden when it takes a child into
care. If the state is to justify removing children from their
parents it can only be on the basis that the state is going to
provide a better quality of care than that from which the
child in care has been rescued (Re F, F v Lambeth London
Borough Council at paras [40]–[43]).
If the state – the local authority – unjustifiably fails in
that endeavour it will find itself liable under the Human 5
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Rights Act. Any child who complains that a local authority
has failed to meet its obligations under Article 8 can bring
a free-standing action in the High Court under sections 7
and 8 of the Human Rights Act. So, for example, a child in
care can in principle bring such proceedings against the
local authority if his placement fails to meet the standards
mandated by Botta v Italy.
The same point can be illustrated by another group of
children who find themselves in a very different setting.
Children in the care of local authorities are not the only
children in the care of the state. There are many children
in prisons, who are the responsibility of the Secretary of
State for the Home Department. They fall into two
categories: those children who are themselves serving
sentences, usually in Young Offender Institutions (“YOIs”),
the subject of my judgment in R (Howard League for Penal
Reform) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002]
EWHC 2497 (Admin), [2003] 1 FLR 484; and those
children who are in prison mother and baby units
(“MBUs”) because their mother are serving sentences, the
subject of the judgment I gave very recently in Claire F v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWHC 111
(Fam).
Let me deal first with the children – they are in fact
babies, because Prison Service policy usually requires them
to be separated from their mothers no later than when they
are 18 months old – who find themselves in MBUs.
There is a significant body of evidence identifying the
various disadvantages to babies – particularly older babies
– of living in MBUs. The fact is that even the best MBU
cannot alone offer the variety that is available in the world
outside prison. In the light of this material, and having
regard to the principle in Botta v Italy, what I said was this
(Claire F v Secretary of State at para [109]):
“It seems to me that, when deciding whether and at what
stage to separate a mother and her baby, the Secretary of
State is entitled to have regard to the potential disadvantages
to the baby of living in the abnormal environment of a MBU.
Indeed, he must have regard to it if he is properly to balance,
as he must, the child’s rights under Article 8 (including the
child’s right to respect for that part of its private life referred
to in Botta v Italy) against the mother’s rights under Article
8 to respect for her family life. I am not saying that this
factor alone will be decisive, but it will often, I suspect, carry
considerable weight, particularly as the child gets older.”
I refused to interfere on the merits with the Secretary of
State’s decision to separate nine-month old Lia-Jade and
her mother Claire. Explaining why, I said (para [199]) that
the Secretary of State was fully entitled to pay particular
attention to the views expressed by a number of
professionals as to the desirability of Lia-Jade being able to
live in a “normal” environment. In the light of Botta v Italy,
I said, this was clearly a most important factor.
The other group of children in prisons – those in young
offenders’ institutions – are, on any view, vulnerable and
needy children. Disproportionately they come from
chaotic backgrounds. Many have suffered abuse or neglect.
The statistics paint a deeply disturbing picture of the
YOI population. They plainly need much support. In
relation to some there are child protection issues. In the
Howard League case at para [11] I described these children
as follows:
“Over half of the children in YOIs have been in care.
Significant percentages report having suffered or experienced
abuse of a violent, sexual or emotional nature. A very large
percentage have run away from home at some time or another.
Very significant percentages were not living with either parent
prior to coming into custody and were either homeless or
living in insecure accommodation. Over half were not
attending school, either because they had been permanently
excluded or because of long-term non-attendance. Over three-
quarters had no educational qualifications. Two-thirds of
those who could be employed were in fact unemployed. Many
reported problems relating to drug or alcohol use. Many had
a history of treatment for mental health problems.
Disturbingly high percentages had considered or even
attempted suicide.”
But the Howard League case also illustrates another
important implication of the principles I have been talking
about. You will recall my earlier comments about the
inadequate protection afforded by the common law to a
prisoner detained lawfully but in degrading conditions and
to a prisoner assaulted by another prisoner. The position
has been revolutionised by the Human Rights Act. In the
Howard League case at paras [65]-[66] I said that Articles 3
and 8 of the Convention:
“protect children in YOIs from those actions by members of
the Prison Service which constitute inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment or which impact adversely and
disproportionately on the child’s physical or psychological
integrity [and] impose on the Prison Service positive
obligations to take reasonable and appropriate measures
designed to ensure that:
(i) children in YOIs are treated, both by members of the
Prison Service and by fellow inmates, with humanity, with
respect for their inherent dignity and personal integrity as
human beings, and not in such a way as to humiliate or
debase them;
(ii) children in YOIs are not subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by fellow
inmates or to other behaviour by fellow inmates which
impacts adversely and disproportionately on their physical
or psychological integrity.”
I added that, quite apart from any other remedies which
there may be arising out of the state’s – the Prison
Service’s – failure to meet its human rights obligations,
sections 7 and 8 of the Human Rights Act enable a victim6
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to bring a free-standing action in the High Court and that
in the case of a claimant who is a child such a claim can
appropriately be brought in the Family Division.
And the implications of that were recently spelt out by
Moses J in a case involving a child in a YOI who alleged
breaches of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention (R (BP) v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWHC
1963 (Admin) at para [42]):
“I would like to stress … the right of a claimant such as this
to bring an action under section 7 of the Human Rights Act
1998 … Such an action would give rise to the possibility of
live evidence in relation to past events, such live evidence
might lend force to the contentions of someone in the position
of the claimant and afford an opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses on behalf of the Home Department. This will
provide a powerful incentive, whatever the result, that that
Department should comply with its obligations in relation to
young detainees under the 1998 Act.”
Thus far I have been considering the substantive rights
accorded to a child by Article 8. And thus far, you may be
thinking to complain, I have had precious little to say that
is relevant to the subject about which I am supposed to be
speaking. But bear with me. I must now turn to another
aspect of Article 8 which is perhaps more directly relevant,
namely the procedural rights that are guaranteed to parents
and children by Article 8.
Let me start with parents, for much of the Strasbourg
and domestic case-law has focussed on their rights.
Article 8 affords parents who are involved in care
proceedings not merely substantive protection against any
inappropriate interference with their private and family life
by public authorities but also significant procedural
safeguards. As the Strasbourg Court has said (McMichael v
United Kingdom (1995) 20 EHRR 205 at para [87]):
“Whilst Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements,
the decision-making process leading to measures of
interference must be fair and such as to afford due respect to
the interests safeguarded by Article 8.”
The fundamental rule was articulated by the court as
long ago as 1988 (W v United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 29
at paras [63]–[64]):
“The decision-making process must therefore … be such as to
secure that [the parents’] views and interests are made known
to and duly taken into account by the local authority and that
they are able to exercise in due time any remedies available to
them … what therefore has to be determined is whether, having
regard to the particular circumstances of the case and notably
the serious nature of the decisions to be taken, the parents
have been involved in the decision-making process, seen as a
whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite
protection of their interests. If they have not, there will have
been a failure to respect their family life and the interference
resulting from the decision will not be capable of being
regarded as “necessary” within the meaning of Article 8.”
What does this mean in practical terms? In one case,
which involved allegations of unfairness in the process
leading up to the hearing of an application for a care order,
I said this (Re L (Care: Assessment: Fair Trial) [2002] EWHC
1379 (Fam), [2002] 2 FLR 730, at para [151]):
“The state, in the form of the local authority, assumes a heavy
burden when it seeks to take a child into care. Part of that
burden is the need, in the interests not merely of the parent
but also of the child, for a transparent and transparently fair
procedure at all stages of the process – by which I mean the
process both in and out of court. If the watchword of the
Family Division is indeed openness – and it is and must be –
then documents must be made openly available and crucial
meetings at which a family’s future is being decided must be
conducted openly and with the parents, if they wish, either
present or represented. Otherwise there is unacceptable scope
for unfairness and injustice, not just to the parents but also to
the children.”
You will note my reference to the parents being
represented if that is what they wish. Referring to
professionals’ meetings (as opposed to a meeting of
experts) I added at para [154] that “a parent or other party
who wishes to should have the right to attend and/or be
represented at the professionals’ meeting”.
In another case a local authority which held a care order
was proposing to remove the children from the parents
with whom they had been placed in accordance with the
care plan approved by the court. The local authority was
alleged to have acted unfairly. I said this (Re G (Care:
Challenge to Local Authority’s Decision) [2003] EWHC 551
(Fam), [2003] 2 FLR 42, at para [45]):
“In a case such as this, a local authority, before it can
properly arrive at a decision to remove children from their
parents, must tell the parents (preferably in writing) precisely
what it is proposing to do. It must spell out (again in
writing) the reasons why it is proposing to do so. It must
spell out precisely (in writing) the factual matters it is relying
on. It must give the parents a proper opportunity to answer
(either orally and/or in writing as the parents wish) the
allegations being made against them. And it must give the
parents a proper opportunity (orally and/or in writing as they
wish) to make representations as to why the local authority
should not take the threatened steps. In short, the local
authority must involve the parents properly in the decision-
making process. In particular, the parents (together with their
representatives if they wish to be assisted) should normally be
given the opportunity to attend at, and address, any critical
meeting at which crucial decisions are to be made.”
Again, you will have noted the reference to the parents’
representatives.
Now although it may be that most of the cases on the
point relate to parental involvement in care proceedings
brought by local authorities, these important principles
are, of course, of general application. As I commented in 7
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the first of the two cases to which I have just referred (Re
L at para [90]):
“I see no reason in principle why the requirements of fairness
mandated by Article 8 should not also apply to the other
persons and agencies involved in child protection work as they
apply to the local authority – after all, many of the decisions
which most directly impact upon parents are properly taken at
multi-disciplinary meetings. Collective decision making surely
carries with it collective responsibility and a collective duty to
act fairly.”
Article 8 guarantees fairness in the decision-making
process at all stages of child protection (Re L at para [88]).
But Article 8 is not confined only to child protection. It
applies also, for example, to decision-making by the Prison
Service when the question for decision is whether or not to
separate an imprisoned mother from her baby (R (P) v
Secretary of State for the Home Department, R (Q) v Secretary of
State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 1151,
[2001] 1 WLR 2002, R (D) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2003] EWHC 155 (Admin), [2003] 1 FLR
979, and Claire F v Secretary of State). As Maurice Kay J has
recently said (R (D) v Secretary of State at para [24]):
“The decision to separate mother and baby is plainly one of
great importance and it is axiomatic that it can only lawfully
be taken within the bounds of procedural fairness.”
Indeed in that case he quashed the decision to separate
mother and baby on the ground (amongst others) that the
procedure adopted “fell well short of what fairness
required”. One of the matters to which he drew attention
at paras [28]-[29] was that “no opportunity was provided
for representations to be made by [the mother] or her
solicitors.” I emphasise those last words.
Moreover, and this is a matter of some importance, the
procedural guarantees afforded by Article 8 apply as much
to the child as to his or her parents. Children are not the
largely passive objects of more or less paternalistic
parental, judicial, local authority or Prison Service
decision-making. A child is as much entitled to the
protection of the Convention – and specifically of Article 8
– as anyone else. The fairness which Article 8 guarantees to
every parent is, of course, equally guaranteed to every child
(Re L at para [150], Claire F v Secretary of State at para [158]).
Thus far I have concentrated on the implications of
Article 8 for local authorities and the Prison Service. But in
principle the procedural safeguards mandated by Article 8
apply to all public authorities whose actions may engage
someone’s Article 8 rights. However, such issues can arise
in many different contexts and different contexts may call
for different procedures. It may be that the demanding
requirements imposed on a local authority or the Prison
Service do not apply in all their full rigour to the very
different context of deportation and removal. And no-one
has yet suggested that a mother’s children require to be
represented in the Crown Court before she is sentenced to
a term of imprisonment. And there may, of course, be cases
of emergency or extreme urgency where it is not possible
to involve parents as fully in the decision-making process as
would normally be appropriate (Re G at para [58]). The
guiding principles are clear enough. How they apply in
particular contexts can only be determined on a case by
case basis.
These principles are not mere rhetoric. The books
already contain reports of at least three cases (Re M (Care:
Challenging Decisions by Local Authority) [2001] 2 FLR 1300,
Re L and Re G) in which the procedures adopted by local
authorities, and two cases (R (D) v Secretary of State and
Claire F v Secretary of State) in which the procedures adopted
by the Prison Service in relation to the separation of
mothers and babies in MBUs, were found to have breached
Article 8.
(Note: Many of the matters I have touched on here are
considered at greater length in a number of cases where the
authorities are considered in some detail: see Re B
(Disclosure to Other Parties) [2001] 2 FLR 1017, Re F, F v
Lambeth London Borough Council [2002] 1 FLR 217, Re L
(Care: Assessment: Fair Trial) [2002] EWHC 1379 (Fam),
[2002] 2 FLR 730, Re S (Adult Patient) (Inherent Jurisdiction:
Family Life) [2002] EWHC 2278 (Fam), [2003] 1 FLR 292,
R (Howard League for Penal Reform) v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2002] EWHC 2497 (Admin), [2003] 1
FLR 484, R (A, B, X and Y) v East Sussex County Council No 2)
[2003] EWHC 167 (Admin), (2003) 6 CCLR 194, Re G
(Care: Challenge to Local Authority’s Decision) [2003] EWHC
551 (Fam), [2003] 2 FLR 42, Re Angela Roddy (A Minor)
[2003] EWHC 2927 (Fam) and Claire F v Secretary of State
for the Home Department [2004] EWHC 111 (Fam)).
The Honourable Mr Justice Munby
